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Abstract: In many African countries, “watershed” elections led to
political liberalization, and to democratization in a handful of cases.
However, years later, many liberalized regimes backslid into
authoritarianism. This paper evaluates the long-term impact of
these election outcomes. Using a transitology framework, it shows
that the reforms implemented at this crucial time dictated the course
of liberalization well into the 2010s. Countries where a cohesive
opposition managed to wrestle power from the elites have retained
their liberalization gains to date. Countries where the opposition
was more disorganized and where civil society was weaker remain,
at best, hybrid regimes.
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The

early 1990s witnessed tremendous political and economic
changes throughout the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union
discredited the viability of authoritarian regimes in Central and
Eastern Europe, Latin America, parts of Asia, and Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA). This phenomena, to which I refer as the “fourth wave
of democratization,”1 swept away many authoritarian regimes and
one-party states, and, in a number of cases, replaced them with
governments determined to enact pro-democratic, liberal reforms. In
South Africa, Benin, Ghana, and Senegal the transition period
1

I borrow the term “fourth wave of democratization” from McFaul (2002), who uses it to
describe regime change in the post-communist space. Typically, it has been the scholarly
practice to refer to any transitions post-1970 as the “third wave of democratization”
(Huntington 1991). However, I find McFaul’s term more useful for this analysis, as it
focuses on the post-1989 transition period in particular, and excludes countries that
attempted democratization prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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resulted in genuine democratization. However, the initial euphoria
surrounding the relatively small number of genuine democratic
transitions in the fourth wave quickly dissipated, as democratization
scholars discovered that regime transitions were rarely synonymous
with democratic consolidation (Wahman 2014). In many African
cases, such as Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia, apparent
political reform has been minimal, and often confined solely to the
holding of multiparty elections, many of which have been fraudulent
(Lindberg 2006). Furthermore, some African regimes, such as
Angola and Cameroon have not transitioned from authoritarian rule,
relying on severe repression to forestall political liberalization.
Successful democratization has proven to be only one of the
possible regime outcomes in the fourth wave. Authoritarian regimes
still exist, although they are less common now than before the
collapse of the Soviet Union (Diamond 2002). However, more
prevalent than democracies and autocracies are “hybrid regimes”
that exhibit elements of both authoritarianism and democracy. In
these countries, multiparty elections may be held regularly, but
government elites consistently manipulate these elections to make
sure that the opposition has little chance of winning (Schedler 2006;
Howard and Roessler 2006).2 As the fourth wave of democratization
draws to a close, scholars recognize that democratic consolidation is
not the global norm. In fact, some argue that we are witnessing
worrying democratic backsliding, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa, as democratic gains have stalled out, if not reversed, post2006 (Gyimah-Boadi 2015; Diamond 2015). If that is the case, then
the watershed election period is all the more crucial to our
understanding why some countries got the transition “right,” while
others got it “wrong.”
This paper focuses on explaining regime variation in the
fourth wave in Sub-Saharan Africa. As such, it is concerned with
two puzzles. First, what leads to successful democratization: why
have some countries managed transitions to democracy, while others
have slipped back into authoritarianism? Second, what gives rise to
and accounts for the persistence of hybrid regimes in the fourth
wave?

2 Throughout the past decade, scholars have coined a variety of labels to describe these
hybrid regimes, such as “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2002), “competitive
authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002), “gray zone” countries (Carothers 2002), and
“semi-authoritarianism” (Ottaway 2003).
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I take the fourth wave founding elections, 3 also referred to as
Africa’s “watershed” elections, as the starting point of inquiry and
argue that the outcomes of these elections conditioned the success or
failure of democratization decades later. Furthermore, I assert that
the outcome of these founding elections was highly determined by
the nature of three key groups involved in the transition process--the old authoritarian elites, opposition movements, and civil society.
In this paper, I develop an agency-centered theoretical framework
that tests the effects of these three groups of actors on the degree of
democratization achieved since the initial transition period. My
findings reveal that opposition cohesion and civil society strength
increase the chances for liberalization and democratization in the
fourth wave. I conclude with a brief discussion of what can be done
to improve the quality of democracy in present-day hybrid and
authoritarian regimes.
Theorizing Democratization Post-1989
Democratization theory has evolved significantly since the 1960s,
reflecting both our increased understanding of the process of
democratization, as well as the incorporation of newer democratic
regimes into the theoretical framework. Initially, democratization
scholars (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966) argued that long-standing
structural factors were the best predictors for the success or failure
of democracy, and historical legacies were seen as the driving force
behind regime change. Furthermore, regime transition was
conceptualized in terms of change towards greater democracy.
These theories worked relatively well in explaining the centurieslong process of democratization in Western Europe, where
democracy developed in concert with capitalism and populations
were relatively homogeneous. However, as many scholars of fourth
wave transitions came to realize, traditional democratization theories
offered little insight into the complex processes unfolding in the
modern world.
Traditional theories could not account for the appearance of
democratic movements in places where the required structural
factors were largely absent. For example, the legacies argument
3

A distinction must be made here between founding elections in general, and the
founding elections in the fourth wave. In Africa, most countries held founding elections
in the 1960s, following the withdrawal of colonial powers. However, with the exception
of Botswana, these elections resulted in the institutionalization of an authoritarian regime,
military rule, or a one-party state. Hence, no more genuinely democratic, multiparty
elections were held until 1990, when a fresh wave of multiparty elections began anew. In
this paper, I focus only on these post-1989 elections.
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cannot explain why economically underdeveloped and resourcepoor Benin developed democratic institutions following its first
multiparty elections in 1991, and why the country is currently one of
the strongest democracies in the region (Stroh 2018), while Togo
and Chad, which share a similar economic and social structure to
Benin, remain authoritarian (Hanson 2015). It became increasingly
apparent that transitioning countries were not simply moving
towards forms of consolidated democracy, but exhibited a wide
range of regime outcomes. As a result, scholars of the fourth wave
of democratization began searching for an alternative theory, one
that reflected the changes taking place during the transition period.
These scholars began analyzing the transition period itself and the
decisions taken at the individual level by the elites, the opposition,
and societal actors (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Easter 1997;
Fish 1999; Jones-Luong 2000; van de Walle 2002; McFaul 2002;
Hale 2005).
One of the crucial steps towards constructing an agency-based
theory to democratic transitions in the fourth wave has been the
application of the transitology paradigm, initially laid out in
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 1986 seminal book Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule. Largely informed by third wave transitions in
Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s, O’Donnell and
Schmitter analyze the interactions between the old elites and
opposition groups. They argue that there is no transition whose
beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the
authoritarian regime itself between the hard-liners and the softliners. Once these divisions become apparent, soft-liners have the
incentive to either defect from the old regime or to initiate pacting,
which they define as talks with the opposition movements on
liberalizing the political system. As the soft-liners lower the cost for
engaging in collective action, they quickly discover that former
political identities reemerge and new ones expand beyond the public
spaces the rulers were willing to tolerate at the beginning of the
transition, (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 48-49). Emboldened by
the thawing-out of the political system, opposition groups will press
for multiparty elections. If the split between the elites is severe, it
will undermine their organizational capacity, lower extent of their
ability to manipulate election results, and, ultimately, harm their
chances of winning the election.
The handful of successful democratic transitions of the early
1990s reinforced the notion among US policymakers and aid
practitioners that countries undergoing political changes were
moving towards democracy. However political scientists engaged in
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the study of democracy noticed that the reality was much murkier.
As Thomas Carothers (2002) points out, many of the countries that
were labeled as transitioning to democracy, such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, were in fact stalled democratic experiments
or were undergoing a reversion to authoritarianism. As such, these
countries were not transitioning at all, but were developing their
own distinct form of governance that mixed authoritarianism with
some elements of democracy.
Given the prevalence of hybrid regimes, it is not surprising
that democracy scholars currently focus primarily on this group of
countries. Although I agree with Howard and Roessler (2006) that
there is a need to study these regimes in relation to one another,
rather than highlighting the numerous ways in which they fall short
of the standard set by advanced democracies, focusing solely on
hybrid regimes obfuscates the larger transition patterns in the region.
The only way to address this is to develop a comprehensive
theoretical framework for regime change that encompasses all of the
fourth wave regime types. In a sense, we must resurrect the
transitology paradigm, while updating it to reflect the prevalence
and persistence of hybrid regimes.
The Transitology Paradigm in the African Context
Initiating Liberalization
The demise of the USSR serves as a critical juncture in this analysis.
The Soviet collapse triggered liberalization in SSA countries in a
number of ways. First, the mass protests in Eastern Europe set off
similar popular protests in SSA (Bratton and van de Walle 1992)
and emboldened opposition movements to push for democratic
reforms in Africa (El-Khawas 2001). Unable to contain public
outcries against the oppressiveness and corruption of the existing
regimes, authoritarian elites were faced with one of three actions,
(see Cheeseman 2015). First, institute genuine liberalizing reforms
and acquiesce to future elections, in the hopes that the dictator can
turn democratizer, and retain his office while maintaining a sense of
wide-spread legitimacy. Arguably, this transpired in 1993 Malawi,
where President-for-Life Hastings Banda held a referendum on
reinstituting multi-party democracy, which passed with 64% of the
vote, and ended the Malawi Congress Party’s 37-year monopoly on
power. General elections the next year saw Banda defeated and
ousted from office. This course of action was rare, as the
authoritarian elites were simply hoping to ride out the maelstrom of
the first multiparty elections.
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Second, the elites could opt for cosmetic reforms, enough to
appease the protesters in the immediate-term, but to forestall any
further liberalization in the future. This was the most common of the
options taken by the elites. Case and point the actions of Benin’s
President Mathieu Kérékou, who held a national conference to
rebuild state authority in 1989, drawing together all sectors of
Beninese society, but with no actual intent of democratizing (Brown
and Kaiser 2007). This type of liberalization was, in many cases,
sufficient to pry the regime open further than the elites originally
intended, as was indeed the case in Benin, where Nicéphore Soglo, a
technocrat in Kérékou’s government, declared conference
sovereignty, established the mechanisms for a transition to a
constitutional democratic regime, and ousted Kérékou. O’Donnell
and Schmitter (1986: 7) point out that if the initial liberalized
practices are not viewed as obviously threatening to the regime
(particularly if the elites perceive their chances of winning the first
elections as relatively high), then they tend to accumulate, become
institutionalized, and raise the perceived costs of eventual
annulment. This then paves the way for future democratization.
The third option for elites was to reject the process of
liberalization, either by instituting minor reforms and planning to
outright manipulate the elections or failing to hold elections
altogether (Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo). In some
cases (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi) elections
were only viable options after the conclusion of prolonged civil
conflict.
Given this array of actions, the chances of democratization
are clearly more likely in the first scenario. However, the second
scenario also has potential for greater political change, and is
determined by the uncertain dynamic of actors’ intentions and
actions during the transition period (Wahman 2014). The third
option leaves no room for democratization, and frequently leads to
violent regime overthrows.
Mass protests are only part of the story. The other motivating
factor conditioning regime change was the de-legitimization of
authoritarianism broadly, both in domestic and international politics.
As Frederick Chiluba in Zambia famously said, if the very architects
of communism cast aside the one-party regime, then who are
Africans to continue to support it (quoted in Bratton and van de
Walle 1992: 425). As authoritarianism came under greater scrutiny
in the international realm, wealthy donors, such as the US, the IMF,
and the World Bank, began demanding political reform by explicitly
mandating multiparty elections. As a result, African dictators were
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forced to initiate multiparty elections, whether genuine or highly
manipulated, as a sign of accepting the new, more democratic rules
of the game (Cheeseman 2015: 93). By May 1991, at least twentyone African governments adopted significant political reforms to
permit greater pluralism and competition, and by 1995, thirty-five
out of the forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries had held multiparty elections, (see Bienen and Herbst 1996; Bratton and van de
Walle 1992; El-Khawas 2001).
The Watershed Elections as a Critical Juncture
For many African countries, the regime type that emerged following
the first multiparty elections has persisted well into the recent years.
In other words, these elections set the precedent for the manner in
which the democratization process was to be carried out. As van de
Walle (2002: 71) points out, “Countries where incumbents went
down in the transition maelstrom are significantly more democratic
today than countries where the dictator rode out the coming of
multiparty politics.” The first elections set patterns that persisted
throughout the decade, and were predicated on whether the
opposition managed to establish themselves during these elections
(van de Walle 2002; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Lindberg 2004
and 2006). Hence, in Mali, Benin, and Cape Verde, incumbent
turnover resulted in the establishment of a stable democratic regime,
while in Angola, Djibouti, and Equatorial Guinea the ability of the
incumbent to retain control has resulted in a constriction of the
political space.
The transitology paradigm offers a fruitful theoretical
framework for analyzing and comparing regime change. In this
framework, the founding elections are a critical juncture in a
country’s transition process; they are an important signal of an
official break with the authoritarian past and a significant departure
from the arbitrariness of authoritarian rule (O’Donnell 2002). At the
same time, founding elections are moments of high uncertainty, and
their results cannot be predicted from the existing political and
social structures (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 61; Schmitter and
Karl 1994: 4-5). During the transition, existing political institutions
become temporarily suspended, and actors are forced to make
hurried and confused choices. Those in power may seriously
overestimate the support for the old regime, while those outside it
may underestimate their capacity to draw votes from the masses
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 61). The outcome of these hurried
decisions is often not what any one group would have initially
preferred (Schmitter and Karl 1994; Fish 1999). In this highly
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uncertain context, the only way to understand regime outcomes is to
examine the roles that key actors play during the transition period
(Fish 1999).
Updating the Transitology Paradigm
There is a critical difference between the findings of O’Donnell and
Schmitter and those of fourth wave scholars. In O’Donnell and
Schmitter’s argument, the drive towards democratization originates,
at least initially, from within the old regime. Yet Africanist scholars
agree that the old elites play a much more limited role in bringing
about political liberalization, and typically have a negative effect on
the prospects for democratization (van de Walle 2002; Bienen and
Herbst 1996; Joseph 1997). However, at the core of both these
arguments lies the idea that elite splits facilitate regime change by
making elites less capable of fending off demands for political
liberalization. As such, I do not view these arguments as necessarily
incompatible. Rather, in the newer democratization theory, the
burden of initiating regime change falls on other actors, (see
Cheeseman 2015).
If the old elites were always resistant to political
liberalization, then what accounts for the regime changes that
transpired throughout SSA? Democratization scholars agree that the
single most important factor leading to political liberalization and
successful democratization in the fourth wave was opposition
victory during the founding elections (Bunce 1999; Fish 1998; van
de Walle 2002; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Easter 1997).
Victory for the opposition served to reinforce the break with the
authoritarian past, and ushered in the potential for democratic
reform. This is not to say that opposition victory immediately
translated into democratic reform. In fact, more recent work by
Wahman (2014) shows that electoral turnover does not necessarily
produce democracy; both opposition victory and incumbent reelection have the potential to improve democratic governance.
According to Wahman, the key factor to consider is the degree of
electoral uncertainty in subsequent elections – if the degree of
uncertainty is high, then both incumbent elites and a recently elected
opposition-turned-government are more likely to erode democratic
norms in the hopes of recapturing office. However, as the historical
institutionalism literature argues (Capoccia and Keleman 2007),
once initial choices are made (i.e., the decision to democratize), they
close off alternative options (i.e., the reconsolidation of power) and
lead to the establishment of institutions that generate selfreinforcing, path-dependent process (i.e., free and fair elections,
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electoral oversight, the independence of the judiciary, etc.). For
example, in Niger, victory for the opposition movement Alliance of
Forces for Change (AFC), comprised of six different parties,
translated into little more than intra-group squabbling in the
legislature, and the consequent break-down of the political system
altogether, (see Gervais 2018). It was only when the old ruling
party, the National Movement for a Society of Development
(MNSD), won the subsequent elections that genuine democratic
reform could proceed anew. However, the case of Niger
demonstrates that once regime change is initiated the chances for
political liberalization increase dramatically.
Turning to the merits of electoral turnover in the watershed
elections, opposition victory signals to the masses that regime
change is possible, and the masses will be more likely to hold the
opposition to its promise of democratic reform (Bunce 1999; Teorell
and Wahman 2018). Second, the old elite will be presented with two
options: disband, and permanently relinquish all hold on political
power, or reform, and adhere to the democratic rules of the new
game (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bunce 1999). Albeit, in
reality, a group of the old elites may nullify election results and
hijack the government, typically in the form of a military coup, or
may suspend any further liberalization. In Niger, President Ousmane
refused to appoint a member of the opposition as prime minister
after his own coalition collapsed. In Nigeria, the military annulled
the election of Chief Abiola as president, and suspended civilian
rule (Bienen and Herbst 1996). These examples highlight the
tentative nature of the transition process.
Opposition victory is highly dependent on the ability of
different opposition groups to ban together during election time, or
opposition cohesion (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Howard and
Roessler 2006; Olukoshi 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van
de Walle 2002). During the transition process, opposition groups
face serious power asymmetries vis-à-vis the old elites, and
opposition parties face an uphill battle in persuading voters to
choose them over the incumbent (Howard and Roessler 2006: 371).
Most of the resources used to fund electoral campaigns are
concentrated in the hands of the old elite, while opposition parties
rely on a handful of patrons, usually their leaders, to finance their
activities. Writing about the general weakness of African opposition
parties, Olukoshi (1999: 29) notes that as part of the strategy
employed by incumbent regimes to weaken the opposition, public
sector patronage was withdrawn from private sector business
organizations that were sympathetic to or identified with the
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opposition. As a result, opposition parties lack the sufficient
resources to build a nationwide political party that has the capacity
to effectively challenge the incumbent. This problem is further
exacerbated in ethnically diverse states, where regional opposition
parties run on platforms that appeal to only their own ethnic groups
(Elischer 2013). Information asymmetries prevail as the government
still has unequivocal control of the media and thus the capacity to
discredit the opposition in the public eye
As a result, it is crucial that opposition groups present a
united front during election time. A cohesive opposition increases
the prospects for democratization in several ways. First, it takes
votes away from the ruling regime and introduces the possibility of
a democratic regime turnover (Bunce 1999; Fish 1999). Second, it
prevents the incumbent regime from utilizing a divide-and conquerstrategy, in which the government manipulates, co-opts, and
represses less powerful opposition parties (van de Walle 2002; van
Eerd 2017). Third, the government will be less likely to engage in
electoral manipulation for fear of public backlash from the
opposition supporters (Howard and Roessler 2006). These factors all
contribute to the institutionalization of democratic practices in a
previously closed political regime. Furthermore, opposition
candidates, once in power, will be more likely to keep their
campaign promises and to stick to the democratic rules of the game
because they realize that the same electorate that voted them into
office may just as easily vote them out (Bunce 1999).
Some authors argue that a vibrant civil society is necessary to
secure opposition victory (Bunce 1999; Bratton and van de Walle
1992; Fish 1999). A vibrant civil society pressures the authoritarian
government for reform, and actively supports opposition candidates
during election time. Furthermore, by actively protesting against the
government, civic groups may encourage old elites to defect to the
opposition, lowering elite capacity to maintain control of the state
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bratton and van de Walle 1992).
On the other hand, if civil society is weak, typically due to the
oppressive nature of the old regime, it will be less vocal about the
need for reform, and will support the authoritarian incumbent for
fear of government backlash. However, as of yet, the role civil
society plays in driving the fourth wave democratization process is
highly undertheorized and is absent from many explanations of
regime change, (for an exception, see Lewis 2018). This is due, in
part, to the belief that civil society in SSA is generally weak and
plays an insignificant role in the transition process (Randall and
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Svasand 2002; Bienen and Herbst 1996; van de Walle 2002; ElKhawas 2001).
There is an important distinction in the function of these two
groups of actors. Opposition movements and political parties
attempt to affect regime change through contesting elections and
holding political office. Civic groups, on the other hand, are not
involved in the government directly, but attempt to affect change
through casting a vote for specific candidates and holding the
political leadership accountable for their policies. Thus, it is possible
to have opposition and civic groups that vary in strength and
effectiveness in the same political system, and these variations
contribute to the different regime outcomes that characterize the
fourth wave.
Explaining Hybrid Regimes
What accounts for the presence of hybrid regimes? Hybrid regimes
emerge in situations where the opposition is fragmented but elite
capacity is too low to fully exclude the opposition from participating
in the new government or to fully consolidate authoritarian rule.
Hence, this new government will be marked by deadlock, and
democratic reform will be either stalled or diluted (Howard and
Roessler 2006; Schedler 2006; Carothers 2002).
Within the hybrid regime category, two different election
outcomes are possible, but the end result is invariably a hybrid
regime. In the first group, the opposition manages to win the first
multiparty elections, despite being fragmented, but is unable to work
together within the new government and to keep the old
authoritarian elites at bay. Although the opposition may attempt to
initiate pro-democratic reform, the old elites will be able to
effectively block any major changes to the political system (Bunce
1999). Furthermore, given the typically poor performance of the
new government, the opposition is voted out of office in the
subsequent elections, and replaced by the “reformed” old elites.
This, in turn, stalls pro-democratic reform.
In the second group, the opposition loses the first multiparty
elections, as a result of electoral manipulation and voter intimidation
by the incumbent, but still manages to gain a minority of seats in the
legislature. At the same time, the incumbent and his party perform
equally poorly, and manage to hold on to office by a slim margin.
As a result, the incumbent cannot prevent a significant
parliamentary opposition from arising, and this opposition keeps the
incumbent party in check, ensuring that at least some of the gains
made during the initial transition period are preserved (van de Walle
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2002). In these cases, it is clear that the incumbent cannot survive a
reasonably free and fair election against a united opposition.
Regime Trajectories in Sub-Saharan Africa
How similar are African regimes today to the regimes they had prior
to the watershed elections and during the transition period? To test
my critical juncture theory, I begin by examining the SSA country
Freedom House (FH) scores one year prior to the transition period,
at the transition period, and at 2014, (25 years after the collapse of
the Berlin Wall). I define the transition period as the year the first
multiparty elections were held. In cases where the elections for the
executive and the legislature are not simultaneous, I consider the
transition period to be the earlier of the two.
For most countries in SSA, the transition period spans the
years 1990-1998. By that time, four countries had not held elections:
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Rwanda,
and Somalia. All four have been mired in either civil war or
international conflict (Eritrea). For the DRC and Rwanda, I identify
the transition year as the period when fighting has ceased and
multiparty elections called, 2006 and 2003 respectively. Somalia
and Eritrea have yet to hold national-level multiparty elections. For
Eritrea, I take its year of independence from Ethiopia as its
transition year. For Somalia, which has experienced no variation in
regime type since before the collapse of the Soviet Union, I take
1990 as the start of its regime trajectory. Furthermore, Botswana and
Mauritius held free and fair multiparty elections in the years prior to
the collapse of communism. For these countries, I take their
transition period to be the next year post-1989 when elections were
held, 1994 and 1991, respectively. As such, these years do not
strictly constitute a transition period. However, the Gambia, which
was rated Free prior to 1990, but then lapsed into authoritarianism in
1994, is a good example of the potential for regime volatility post1989.
If the transition period is not relatively important, then the
first multiparty elections should have little, to no impact, on the
success or failure of democratization. Instead, historical and
structural factors, which have developed over time, and predate the
transition period, should drive the democratization process. If the
transitology argument is correct, and actors, not structural factors,
drive the transition process, then a country’s regime in 2014 should
roughly resemble its regime type during and after the transition
period. Furthermore, if the founding elections represent a significant
break with the past, then a country’s regime type during the
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transition period should look markedly different than the one it has
immediately prior to the transition.
Table 1 Regime Trajectories of Present-Day African Democracies
Year before
Transition
Democracies
Botswana
Gambia
Mauritius
Namibia

Transition
Period
Remained
Democracy
Botswana
Gambia
Mauritius
Namibia
Transitioned from
Hybrid to
Democracy
Benin
Cape Verde

Mali
Sao Tome &
Principe
South Africa
Zambia

Transitioned from
Authoritarian to
Democracy
Malawi

2014
Remained
Democracy
Benin
Botswana
Cape Verde
Mauritius
Namibia
Sao Tome &
Principe
South Africa
Transitioned
from Hybrid to
Democracy
Ghana
Lesotho
Senegal
Transitioned
from
Authoritarian to
Democracy
N/A

Table 1 shows the regime trajectories of present-day African
democracies. Only four countries were rated as Free by FH on year
prior to the transition period (Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius, and
Namibia), and remained Free during the transition. Six countries
improved their democratic rankings during the transition period by
shifting from the Partially Free (hybrid) to the Free category, while
one country (Malawi) transitioned from a Not Free (authoritarian)
regime to democracy. Four of the transition democracies (Benin,
Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Africa) remained
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Table 2 Regime Trajectories of Present-Day African Hybrid
Regimes
Year before
Transition
Transition
Period
2014
Hybrid
Regimes
Angola
Benin
Burundi
Cape Verde
CAR
Congo
(Brazzaville)
Cote d'Ivoire
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mali
Niger

Nigeria
Sao Tome
Principe
Senegal

Seychelles
South Africa

Swaziland
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Remained Hybrid
Central
African
Republic
Congo (Brazzaville)
Cote d'Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho

Remained Hybrid

Madagascar
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Seychelles
Uganda
Zimbabwe

Madagascar
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Tanzania

Transitioned
Democracy
Hybrid

from
to

Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Liberia

Transitioned from
Democracy to
Hybrid

&
N/A

Malawi
Mali

Transitioned from
Authoritarian to
Hybrid
Comoros

Zambia
Transitioned from
Authoritarian to
Hybrid
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Togo

Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
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democracies in the long-term, along with the four original
democracies. By 2014, several countries experienced democratic
setbacks, reverting to a hybrid regime (Malawi, Mali, and Zambia),
while one became authoritarian (the Gambia). Additionally, three
countries managed democratization well after the transition period
(Ghana, Lesotho, and Senegal). Of the eleven countries that were
democracies during their transition period, seven retained their Free
status.
Table 2 reports the regime trajectories for present-day hybrid
regimes. Prior to the transition year, 22 African countries were
ranked Partly Free. During the transition 12 kept their Partly Free
status, and were joined by nine previously Not Free regimes. Of
these 21 hybrid regimes, twelve remain hybrids today. The
transition period had a long-term liberalizing effect in Comoros,
Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. Three
countries transitioned to hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones
following the transition period: Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Togo.
Finally, Table 3 displays the regime trajectories for present-day
authoritarian regimes. The year prior to transition, 21 African
countries were ranked Not Free, and twelve of them failed to
liberalize during the transition period. They were joined by Angola,
Burundi, Guinea, and Swaziland in the transition year. Of these 25
transition autocracies, 13 remain Not Free currently. Furthermore,
there were significant political setbacks in seven African states in
the long term: the CAR, Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon,
the Gambia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Overall, the FH scores reveal that the transition period did
have significant and long-term liberalizing effects on 17 of 48
African countries. Furthermore, the transition period does appear to
guide the trajectories of the majority of African countries today.
Sixty-seven percent of SSA countries have the same regimes today
as they did in the transition period. To better understand the
stability/volatility of these regime trajectories, I construct a measure
titled “time in stasis.” The measure looks at the percentage of time,
from the transition period to 2014, that a country maintains the same
regime (Free, Partly Free, or Not Free) as it had in the transition
period. Higher values indicate greater regime type stability. As one
can see from Table 4, 18 countries have no variation in their regime
trajectory, post-transition. Overall, 69% of countries spend a high
proportion of time in stasis, while roughly 16% fluctuate at a
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medium level and 16% at a high level. It appears that most regimes
do become locked into their regime type post-early 1990s.
Table 3 Regime Trajectories of Present-Day African Autocracies
Year before
Transition
Transition Period
2014
Authoritarian
Regimes
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
Comoros
DRC
Djibouti
Equatorial
Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi

Mauritania
Mozambique
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan

Tanzania
Togo

Remained
Authoritarian
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Chad
DRC
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea

Remained
Authoritarian
Angola
Burundi
Cameroon
Chad
Djibouti
DRC

Eritrea
Mauritania
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Togo

Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Mauritania
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland

Transitioned:
Hybrid to
Authoritarian
Transitioned: Hybrid
to Authoritarian
CAR
Congo (Brazzaville)
Ethiopia
Gabon

Angola
Burundi
Guinea
Swaziland
Transitioned from
Democracy
to
Authoritarian
N/A

Uganda
Zimbabwe
Transitioned
Democracy
Authoritarian
The Gambia

from
to
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Table 4 Time “in Stasis” of African Regimes, Transition Period to Present
High (100% - 75%)
Angola - 100
Benin - 100
Botswana - 100
Cameroon - 100
Cape Verde - 100

Medium (74% - 50%)
Kenya - 61
Senegal - 59
Lesotho - 55
Djibouti - 52
Burundi - 50

Chad - 100

Congo (Brazzaville) 50

Zambia - 8

Togo - 50

Burkina Faso - 4

Comoros - 100
Equatorial Guinea 100
Madagascar - 100
Mauritius - 100
Mozambique - 100
Namibia - 100
Sao Tome & Principe
- 100
Seychelles - 100
South Africa - 100
Sudan - 100
Swaziland - 100
Tanzania - 100
Uganda - 95
Guinea-Bissau – 90
Sierra Leone - 89
Niger - 86
CAR - 83
Liberia - 83
Mali - 83
Eritrea - 82
Mauritania - 78
Nigeria - 78
Guinea - 77
Gabon - 76
Ethiopia - 75
N= 31
69%

N=7
15.50%

Low (Below 49%)

Zimbabwe - 44
Cote d'Ivoire - 36

Ghana - 35
Malawi - 24
Gambia - 9

N=7
15.50%
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Table 5 Regime Outcomes as Reflection of Opposition Cohesion and
Civil Society Strength
Opposition Wins
Cohesive
Democracy
Cape Verde (0)
Lesotho (1)
Mauritius (1)
Namibia (1)
S.T. & Principe (0)
South Africa (2)
Hybrid
Niger (1)
Zambia (2)

Autocracy
Burundi (.)

Opposition Loses
Cohesive
Fragmented

Fragmented
Benin (2)

Botswana (2)
Ghana (0)

Senegal (0)

Madagascar (2)
Malawi (2)
Mali (2)

Burkina Faso (1)
Cote d'Ivoire (1)
Mozambique (0)
Seychelles (0)

Comoros (0)
Guinea (0)
Guinea-Bissau (0)
Kenya (2)
Liberia (0)
Nigeria (1)
Sierra Leone (0)
Tanzania (1)
Togo (0)

CAR (0)
Congo-Brazz. (1)

Angola (0)
Djibouti (0)

Cameroon (0)
Chad (0)
DRC (.)
Eq. Guinea (0)
Gabon (1)
Mauritania (0)
Sudan (0)
The Gambia (0)
Uganda (0)
Zimbabwe (1)

Finally, how well do opposition cohesion and civil society
strength during the transition period predict long-term
democratization in the SSA region? To measure opposition
cohesion, I use the Bratton and van de Walle Opposition Cohesion
measure, taken from the Political Regimes and Regime Transitions
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in Africa data set.4 The opposition cohesion measure is
dichotomous, with countries receiving a score of 1 if the opposition
was cohesive during the watershed elections and, 0 otherwise. I
measure civil society strength using Freedom House’s How
Freedom is Won report, which rates the strength of civic movements
during the transition period on a three-point scale. In the report,
Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) define civil society as a
grassroots conglomeration of civic forces that includes civic
organizations, students, and trade unions, who may turn to mass
protests, strikes, boycotts, blockades, and other forms of civic
disobedience to affect political change. The report codes half the
countries in SSA. I rely on the Bratton and van de Walle dataset to
code the remaining countries. The dataset provides information on
the number of trade unions and civic organizations active during the
transition period, as well as the number of political protests in each
SSA country. The Bratton and van de Walle data correlates nicely
with that available from the Freedom House report.
Table 5 identifies the strength of the opposition and civil
society at the time of transition for present-day democracies, hybrid
regimes, and authoritarian regimes. The pattern is most striking in
the case of democracies versus authoritarian regimes. Present-day
democracies had the largest proportion of cohesive opposition
movements than either hybrids or autocracies. In most democracies,
a cohesive opposition translated into an opposition victory. In only
one case, Burundi, did a cohesive opposition win an election, but the
regime remained authoritarian. This is reflective of the civic war that
broke out shortly after the first multiparty elections. In Niger and
Zambia, a cohesive opposition won the first elections, but the
country remained a hybrid regime in the long-term.
If democratic regimes are marked by victorious and cohesive
opposition movements, the reverse is true in autocracies. In twothirds of present-day authoritarian regimes, the opposition was
fragmented and lost the first multiparty elections. That being said,
the distribution of countries across the four columns is fairly similar
across hybrids and autocracies. However, the difference in civic
society scores helps explain why the former liberalized more than
the latter. In 56% of the hybrid regimes, civic society was
moderately strong (1) or strong (2). Compare that with only 20% of
authoritarian regimes where civil society was moderately strong.
4

Bratton and van de Walle’s “Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa: A
Comparative Handbook” is available online at the University of Michigan International
Consortium for Political and Social Research.
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Table 5 identifies the strength of the opposition and civil
society at the time of transition for present-day democracies, In
short, the analysis presented here confirms the longstanding
argument made by democratization scholars that opposition
cohesion is crucial to successful democratization. However, it also
points to the importance of a vibrant civil society in affecting
positive regime change. When coupled together, the two groups
produce a democratic regime. When a cohesive opposition is absent
during the founding elections, a strong civil society still has the
capability of creating momentum for democratic reform, and
ensuring that the old elites do not revert back to authoritarianism. In
the following section, I explore these arguments in greater detail by
drawing on a two demonstrate the dynamic between elites,
opposition groups, and civil society, and the roles that these groups
play in the transition process. Furthermore, I show how the outcome
of the founding elections condition the prospects of democratization
further down the line.
Regime Transitions and Path-Dependency
As the above analysis suggests, there were two causal mechanisms
that dictated the outcome of the first multiparty elections: opposition
cohesion and civil society strength. Whether a country emerged
from the transition phase as a full democracy, a hybrid regime, or an
autocracy was largely predicated on the relative strength and
capability of these two different sets of actors. Following the
outcome of the first multiparty election, 68% of the countries found
themselves “locked into” their regime type, indicating that building
and maintaining democratic institutions is a path-dependent process.
Formal definitions of path-dependence are rare, and almost
always subject to the scholar’s interpretation. However, more
generally, path-dependence refers to the notion that specific patterns
of timing and sequence matter, and that large consequences may
result from ostensibly small events. Certain events have the potential
to become “critical junctures,” setting the course for political
development in a particular direction that becomes impossible to
reverse as time goes on (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). In the context
of regime transitions, path dependence implies that once a country
has started down a particular track, or trajectory, the costs for
reversing that trajectory are very high. As Margaret Levi points out,
“There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial
choice,” (Levi 1997: 28). Thus, earlier events matter more than later
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ones, and different sequences of events may produce entirely
different outcomes, or regime types.
In this analysis, the transition period is the “critical juncture,”
and the ways in which the first multiparty elections played out
dictate the long-term success or failure of democratization. Pathdependence, as a social process, is grounded in the dynamic of
“increasing returns” (Pierson 2000). Institutions or processes, once
established, generate feedback mechanisms that reinforces these
institutions, and make switching to a different course of action
extremely difficult and costly (North 1990). In the context of the
fourth wave transitions, the winners of the founding elections dictate
the new rules of the game: they either create new institutions and
procedures that reinforce the process of democratic reform, or they
resurrect old authoritarian institutions and practices that prevent
further reform from taking place (Easter 1997; Jones-Luong 2000).
Although, typically, civil society’s role in creating new democratic
institutions is less clearly defined, the cases in this sample show that
civic action can have a profound effect on the initiation of the
democratization process and on the long-term adherence to the new
rules of the game.
New Democracies
In democracies, where a cohesive opposition won the founding
elections, the new pro-democratic government set explicit limits on
executive power, which constituted a definitive break with the
authoritarian past. The new government was much more likely to
enshrine the principle of checks on executive power in a new
constitution that empowered the courts, and made the judiciary an
independent actor in determining the legitimacy of executive
decisions and upholding the rule of law, (see Magnusson 2001).
A cohesive and powerful opposition was much more
successful in creating rifts within the old authoritarian elite and
shifting the balance of power in favor of the new pro-democratic
government. In such cases, during the period surrounding the
founding elections, old elites sensed that the tide was turning against
them, and that the opposition had gained significant support among
the masses—significant enough to carry off a victory. Perceiving the
probability of a loss in the founding elections, rank-and-file
members of the old elite deserted their old party, distancing
themselves from the party bureaucracy and realigning themselves
more closely with the opposition. By doing so, these elites indicated
that they accepted and supported the new rules of the game, thereby
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solidifying the country’s commitment to political reform, and
“locking” the country into a path of democratization.
An active civil society was important for successful
democratic reform in three ways. First, in most cases, the initial
opening up of the authoritarian system was done in response to mass
political protests against the government, which indicated to the old
regime that political reform could no longer be forestalled (Bratton
and van de Walle 1992). These protests signaled the breakdown of
authoritarian rule and created a widespread sense that there were
alternatives to the old order. These mass demonstrations indicated to
the old elite that the opposition camp would have popular support
during election time, and prompted the old elites to abandon
authoritarianism and defect to the opposition. This is precisely why
a successful democratic transition also hinges on decisive civic
action, rather than solely on opposition cohesion.
Second, a vibrant civil society severely limited the options
available to the old elites during the transition period. If the
opposition could mobilize widespread support among the
population, this raised the cost of incumbent attempts to perpetuate
electoral fraud, made it less likely that fraud would succeed, and
perhaps deterred the incumbent from attempting it in the first place
(Hale 2005: 141). Any attempts to do so carried the risk of mass
uprisings, which would be costly to suppress and threaten the
country’s stability. In SSA, where post-colonial rule was marred by
political protests and subsequent military coups, many incumbents
were cautious about perpetrating overt electoral fraud.
Finally, an active civil society was instrumental in
conditioning both the opposition and the old elites to adhering to the
new rules of the democratic game. Once elected to office on the
promise of democratic reform, opposition parties were bound to
their platforms. Because both the opposition and the old elites had
accepted the standard of free and fair multiparty elections,
opposition parties were aware that a failure to carry out their
promises could potentially result in a loss of power in the
subsequent elections. If old elites wanted to an opportunity to
recoup their powerful positions, the only means of doing so was to
rebrand themselves as democratizers and submit to the new rules of
the game. If the old elites managed to win subsequent elections, they
were conditioned to follow through with the democratic reform
initiated by the opposition and civil society, or risk being ousted out
of office in the following elections. Hence, we see that the extent of
civic protest and active participation in the elections process is, in
itself, part of the dynamic of increasing returns.
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The victory of Nicéphore Soglo in the Beninese watershed elections
provides an instructive example. Although Soglo rode into office on
a wave of promises to reform the political system and resurrect the
failing economy, his term proved highly disappointing. Shortly after
taking office, Soglo’s wife was implicated in corrupt activities,
crime increased drastically, and the economy plunged into crisis
(Magnusson 2001). Civil society took to the streets and a military
coup was barely averted. On August 2, 1994, in an attempt to
consolidate power and remedy the failing economy, Soglo invoked
emergency powers under the constitution to execute his own budget.
The national assembly was outraged by what it perceived as an
abuse of presidential power. Because Benin’s constitution requires
the national assembly to fix a deadline limiting the validity of
emergency powers, the assembly quickly voted for a deadline of
August 5, and appealed the presidential action to the constitutional
court (Magnusson 2001: 225). The court ruled in favor of the
national assembly, asserting its new authority as the neutral final
arbiter of executive-legislative disputes. This incident set an
important precedent for future constraints on executive power, and
demonstrated that the court was fully committed to upholding the
rules outlined in the new constitution.
As can be seen above, the political environment in Benin in 1994
was highly volatile, and threatened long-term democratic stability in
the country. However, despite the outbreak of protests against the
Soglo government, civil society and the general populace chose to
mediate its frustrations through formal institutional channels, such
as political parties, government-union negotiations, and most
importantly, elections (Magnusson 2001). In the 1996 presidential
elections, Soglo’s principal opponent was none other than a newlyreformed Kérékou, who won the elections with ease. The result was
a peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected leader
to another, which demonstrates the commitment of both elites and
civil society to consolidating democracy in Benin. Furthermore,
although both Kérékou and Soglo contested the 2001 presidential
elections, with Kérékou winning by a slim margin, both men
peacefully accepted that they were barred from running in the 2006
elections due to the age restrictions outlined in the constitution.
Present-Day Autocracies
In authoritarian regimes, the opposition was highly fragmented and
weak at the time of the founding elections, and was inevitably
crushed by the old regime. Whatever momentum for pro-democratic
reform existed prior to the elections was subsequently stomped out
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by the old elite. However, in many cases, electoral victory for the
old regime was not over-determined at the outset of the transition
period, and regime turnover was genuinely possible even in the
more repressive regimes.5
During the first multiparty elections, it was difficult for both
the authoritarian elite and the opposition to effectively gauge their
potential appeal to the electorate, as well as the power of their
opponents. Old elites may have been uncertain about the way that
the elections would play out, but sensing the disorganized nature of
the opposition, remained ostensibly loyal to the old regime. I say
ostensibly because I take as given the assumption that political elites
are motivated primarily by career security, and the desire to
maintain or advance their positions (Hale 2005; Magaloni 2006). If
the elites judge that it would be more personally and politically
beneficial to defect, they are more likely to do so, and in greater
numbers, despite their ideological preferences over a certain type of
political system.
In authoritarian regimes, the old elites adopted a wait-and-see
strategy, suspending any definitive actions until after the first
elections, which would send clear signals about the strength of the
incumbent and the opposition. When the incumbent won the
elections, be it through political manipulation or through a
legitimate electoral mandate, the elites chose to throw their lots in
with the winner, and accept the continuation of the old authoritarian
regime. In doing so, they participated in the reinforcement of old
authoritarian institutions that concentrated all the power in the
executive, and allowed the incumbent to suspend further reform.
These countries quickly adopted presidential systems that placed all
the power in the hands of the incumbent, while stripping the
legislature of any true power (van de Walle 2003).
The outcome of the first multiparty elections gave the
incumbent a carte blache to manipulate the political system, crafting
policies that would prevent the opposition from posing an effective
challenge to authoritarian rule. The new constitutions and electoral
reforms in these countries prohibited any checks on the executive
power and disempowered the national courts. Electoral commissions
and Constitutional Courts were staffed with supporters of the old
regime, (see Makumbe 2002). Voting eligibility requirements were

5

For example, both Benin and Cameroon had similarly repressive regimes prior to the
transition period, as well as highly unpopular incumbents contesting the founding
elections. Yet, Benin managed a relatively fluid transition to democracy, while Cameroon
remains under the oppressive leadership of Biya, despite holding regular elections.
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changed to exclude any potential dissenters of the regime (Makumbe
2002; Chirot 2006).
For example, following the founding elections in Cote
d’Ivoire, President Henri Konan-Bédié and his camp created the
concept of “Ivorité,” which excluded those that lived in the northern
region of the country, the region where he received the least
electoral support. Bédié passed new citizenship laws that required
proof that one’s parents had been born in Côte d’Ivoire, but this was
for the most part only required of northerners. As a result, many
northerners were stripped of their citizenship and classified as
“foreigners,” (Chirot 2006: 68). Furthermore, Bédié introduced a
new electoral code stipulating that a presidential candidate had to be
born of Ivorian parents, thereby effectively sideling his only serious
rival, Alassane Outtara, a northerner (Bratton 1998: 58).
A passive civil society damaged the prospects for
democratization. The lack of civic protest against the regime
indicated to the old elites that the opposition would have a highly
difficult time mobilizing an electorate to vote in its favor, and thus,
kept the old elites in the incumbent’s camp. Lack of civic
engagement allowed the incumbent to postpone the founding
elections and marshal all of his resources to rig the elections.
Bratton (1998: 56) points out that, “As the 1990s progressed, leaders
became adept at accommodating the international norm of
competitive elections, while at the same time learning to manipulate
them to their own ends. In general, the later founding elections were
held in Africa, the poorer the quality of their conduct and the lower
the likelihood that incumbents would lose.”
The absence of strong civic organizations hurt the prospects
for long-term democratization because it did not provide opposition
parties with sources for mass mobilization around genuine issues of
reform. Instead, as has been the case in most of SSA, opposition
parties focus primarily on the politics of ethnic identity that appeal
only to a small subset of the electorate (Randall and Svasand 2002:
41). The result is a highly fragmented opposition that avoids the
important issue of democratic reform, and aims at securing
representation and political favors for their particular ethnic or
regional group (van de Walle 2003). Finally, this fragmented nature
of the opposition makes it much easier for the incumbent to co-opt
parties in the legislature in exchange for minor concessions, thereby
lessening the odds that a cohesive opposition will challenge the
government on grounds of genuine democratic reform.
Take, for example, the 1992 watershed elections in
Cameroon, which pitted incumbent President Paul Biya and his
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Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) against
opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi and his Social Democratic Front
(SDF). At the outset, Biya was reluctant to democratize and only
conceded to opening up the political space as a means of appeasing
his French benefactors. At the time of the elections, domestic
discontent with Biya’s regime was widespread, leading many
international observers to conclude that the introduction of
multiparty politics would inevitably result in Biya’s demise
(Takougang 2003, 473). Fru Ndi was a highly popular candidate,
whose 1990 unauthorized move to form the SDF, in spite of a ban
on multiparty politics, earned him tremendous national appeal.
However, between 1991 and 1992, the SDF made a series of
mistakes that severely undermined any leverage it had against the
highly unpopular regime and fragmented the coalition of many
opposition parties and civic groups, the National Coordination of
Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA). For one, the SDF
failed to successfully carry off the Ghost Town protests, a series of
boycotts and demonstrations against the Biya regime, thereby
creating a rift between different factions of the NCOPA, with some
groups arguing that the project had run its course and should be
abandoned. Two, they withdrew their representatives from the
Tripartite Conference, organized by Biya with the intent of
forestalling genuine reform, while two other major opposition
parties signed the final Conference Accords. Most importantly, still
angry over the dictatorial manner with which the Biya regime
conducted the conference, the SDF refused to participate in the 1992
legislative elections. According to most political observers, Biya and
the CPDM were so politically weak in 1992 that the SDF would
certainly have won the majority of the seats in the legislature and
would have the opportunity to directly influence the political
process.
The fragmented state of the opposition was also evident in the
1992 presidential elections, in which the SDF did participate. Going
into the election, Fru Ndi was by far the most popular candidate, and
could have easily won the elections had Bello Bouba Maigari, a
third-party candidate, thrown his support behind Fru Ndi rather than
running his own campaign and splitting the opposition vote. In the
end, Biya received 40% of the national vote, as compared to Fru
Ndi’s 36% and Bouba Maigari’s 19.2 % (Olukoshi 2001: 273). Had
the opposition banned together, Biya could have been easily
deposed. Bouba Maigari then dealt another blow to the opposition
by endorsing the outcome of the elections, while the SDF and other
opposition parties were protesting the results.
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Bouba Maigari’s actions are telling of the way that the Cameroonian
opposition parties have chosen to deal, and bargain, with Biya’s
regime. Following Biya’s presidential victory, two high-ranking
members of Bouba Maigari’s party, the National Union for
Democracy and Progress (UNDP), accepted cabinet posts in the
Biya government. Because both men accepted the positions without
the approval of the party’s leadership, they were dismissed from the
party. However, five years later, Bouba Maigari, himself, accepted a
cabinet post in the Biya regime without party approval (Takougang
2003: 440). Even more discouraging for the state of Cameroonian
opposition politics is that even the SDF, which has been fighting the
Biya regime for over a decade, may be willing to be co-opted by the
regime. In 2002, following the legislative elections in which the
CPDM won a majority of seats, reports circulated that the SDF was
willing to join the administration if it was offered six cabinet
positions, including the post of prime minister (Takougang 2003:
440).
The inability of the SDF to wrestle power away from the Biya
regime in the early phases of the transition period had a devastating
effect on the pace and extent of political reform in Cameroon.
However, the other major opposition parties are to blame as well.
They have routinely allowed themselves to be manipulated and coopted by the Biya regime, and are willing to sacrifice democratic
reform in exchange for personal wealth and a greater access of
power to the political system. For its part, civil society played a very
limited role in the transition process. Although the masses were
willing to participate in boycotts and demonstrations, they did so
with little planning and for only a short period of time. The
continuation of the Biya regime well into 2018 has left many people
apathetic to democratic reform and has fostered a general distrust in
the political process. As a result, voter turn out is very low, and civil
society has retreated into the private space (Nkwi 2006).
Hybrid Regimes
In hybrid regimes, where neither the old authoritarian elite nor the
opposition manage to win a clear electoral mandate and are forced to
govern in cooperation with the opposing side, the extent of
democratization will necessarily be stalled until the opposition
emerges victorious (Bunce 1999; McFaul 2002). The likelihood of
opposition victory hinges on its ability to form a cohesive coalition
among various opposition parties and their supporters. This is no
easy task during the initial transition period, when numerous
opposition parties attempt to carve out their niche in the incipient
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party system. These parties are tempted to secure the spoils of
victory for themselves, and may be reluctant to consider sharing
these spoils with others. It becomes even more difficult to form
cohesive coalitions with subsequent elections, and to convince the
electorate that an opposition-led government is a viable alternative
to the government of the day. This dynamic, explored below, creates
feedback mechanisms that lock the country into a hybrid regime
trajectory and prevents the consolidation of democracy.
In hybrid regimes, the rules of the game, as well as elite
policy preferences, are ill defined, as the opposing sides attempt to
accomplish their contradictory agendas within the same political
space. While the opposition pushes for further democratic reform,
the old elites strive to preserve the status quo and hold on to the
power resources left over from the old regime (Easter 1997). This
situation is complicated by the fact that both the opposition and the
old elites are weak and have to share institutional power (Bunce
1999). Typically, the incumbent, or his party, managed to win the
presidency in the founding elections, but failed to prevent the
opposition from gaining a significant portion of seats in the
legislature. Thus, while the incumbent tried to rewrite the rules of
the game to consolidate his power, the opposition was strong
enough to block at least some of the anti-democratic reforms. The
result is authoritarian rule coupled with some democratic reform that
defines hybrid regimes (van de Walle 2002).
For opposition parties, gaining unequivocal control of both
the executive and the legislature is key to crafting successful prodemocratic reform. However, there are a number of reasons that
opposition parties in hybrid regimes have consistently failed to win
a clear victory in the polls following the founding elections. Clearly,
old elites still command many of the power resources left over from
the old regime, which allows them to manipulate the electoral
process (Howard and Roessler 2006). Yet, more importantly,
opposition parties themselves have failed to pursue an effective
strategy that would give them an advantage vis-à-vis the incumbent
during election time or facilitate democratic reform.
For example, in Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi barely survived
the watershed presidential elections, winning only 36% of the
popular vote. Although these elections were not deemed free and
fair by the international community, part of the reason for Moi’s
victory was the highly fragmented nature of the opposition. In the
parliamentary elections held that same year, Moi’s party, Kenya
African National Union (KANU), which had held power for forty
years, received an equally dismal proportion of the vote, 24.5%. The
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next largest share of votes went to the opposition party Forum for
the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)-Asili, who received 20.6%.
Moi went on to win the next presidential elections in 1997.
In 2002, Moi’s was constitutionally barred from running for
president, although some of his supporters proposed amending the
constitution to allow him to run for a third presidential term.
However, facing significant international and domestic pressure,
Moi chose to step down peacefully, and appoint a successor, instead.
Moi’s successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, lost the presidential elections to
Mwai Kibaki, who had run against Moi in the past two elections.
Kibaki’s opposition party National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)
similarly won by a landslide in the 2002 parliamentary elections,
proving that opposition victory is possible if the opposition parties
ban together (Ndegwa 2003). The removal of Moi and KANU from
office clearly shows that political liberalization is possible in hybrid
regimes, given the incumbent adheres to the democratic rules of the
game.
One of chief problems with the strategy of the opposition is
that party platforms are typically designed solely to attract enough
voters in the hopes of winning the election, but lacking in substance
or a clear direction for future political reform (Randall and Svasand
2002; van de Walle 2002). As Randall and Svasand (2002: 33) write
about the state of African party politics, “…it seems to be that
parties care little about presenting clearly distinguishable policy
platforms, and that, if, exceptionally, they do, the platform has little
relevance to what the party does once in office.” Although the idea
of pro-democratic reform may be popular among the masses,
citizens are rarely mobilized along these lines. Instead, they are
forced to choose among candidates representing regional or ethnic
differences, or running on their personal popularity among a small
group of voters. Even when opposition candidates are elected to
office, no coherent pro-democratic reform strategy emerges and no
new institutions are created to “lock-in” that strategy.
Because the party system is not yet fully crystallized, and
coherent party agendas not yet defined, new parties spring up
regularly around election time, and further add to the fragmentation
of the embryonic party system (Randall and Svasand 2002; van de
Walle 2002). Seeing that significant room still exists for newer
parties to put forth their agendas and carve out their own niche in the
party system, many (local/regional) elites are tempted to create their
own parties in order to contest elections and reap the benefits of
political power, rather than joining up with the already established
opposition parties. As is the case with authoritarian regimes, even
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when these small opposition parties do manage to win seats in
parliament, they are particularly prone to cooptation by the old
elites. Thus, in hybrid regimes, the ill-defined rules of party
competition that emerge following the initial transition period allow
for small parties to enter the political arena and fragment the party
system, thereby reinforcing sporadic and fleeting democratic reform.
If opposition parties are unwilling or incapable of working
together to further the democratic agenda, where does the impetus
for political reform originate? If the opposition remains fragmented
following the first multiparty elections, what prevents the old elites
from capturing the political system and overhauling any of the
democratic gains of the initial transition? The analysis here suggests
that the key causal mechanism is the presence of an active civil
society.
In the beginning of the transition period, hybrid regime civic
groups played a more marginal role in demanding democratic
reform and opening up the political space than in present-day
democracies. However, by voting in at least some opposition parties
in the founding elections, civil society did indicate to the old elites
that democratic reform had to be put on the political agenda.
Furthermore, as in the case of present-day democracies, the threat of
public backlash against overt electoral manipulation made it more
likely that the old elites would avoid such behavior. Hence, in
hybrid regimes, civil society serves the same functions as in
democratic regimes, as it waits for opposition parties to better define
their platforms, form cohesive coalitions, and present a viable
alternative to the ruling government of the day.
The growth of civic activism over the past decade and a half
has led to further liberalization of the political space in many hybrid
regimes. While civil society may have been relatively passive in the
beginning phases of the democratic transition, due to the high level
of uncertainty surrounding the incumbent’s willingness to use force
and repression to punish regime dissenters, the recent years have
seen a dramatic increase in civic protest against anti-democratic
government policies. These events show the capacity of an active
civil society to affect the course of the transition and improve the
quality of the democratization process.
Conclusion
The fourth wave of democratization gave rise to a variety of regimes
across the globe. As some countries managed a successful transition
to democracy, others stalled mid-process or reverted back to
authoritarianism. In places like the DRC, Somalia, and Swaziland,
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regime change has yet to occur. This analysis reveals that the
transition period, and the events surrounding it, are a significant
determinant of a country’s trajectory towards or away from
successful democratization. In particular, the success of the
democratic transition depends largely on the level of cohesion
among the various opposition parties contesting elections. Only by
presenting a united front during election time does the opposition
movement stand a chance of ousting the authoritarian incumbent.
Furthermore, for democratization to become institutionalized, the
incumbent must be ousted, even if only temporarily. This analysis
also indicates that civic protest does drive the democratization
process. A vibrant civil society is equally important for building and
consolidating democracy, and political protest and participation in
civic groups does create impetus for regime change.
These findings have significant policy implications. Foreign
aid directed at democracy building should target opposition groups.
Western donors must encourage diverse opposition parties to work
together and construct political platforms that appeal to the whole
national electorate, rather than regional segments of the population.
Furthermore, if possible, donors must assist the opposition in the
dissemination of factual information that highlights the benefits of
democracy. Only in this way can the opposition hope to overcome
the information asymmetry problem that benefits authoritarian
regimes. Foreign aid should also support the development of a
healthy civil society. The greatest challenge facing the revitalization
of civic groups is lack of financial resources and organizational
know-how. In authoritarian and hybrid regimes, most of the state’s
resources remain in the hands of the old elite, who will not finance
organizations that are potential sites of dissent. In the meantime,
many of these countries have poor economies, and their citizens
struggle from day to day to make a living. Thus, without foreign aid,
it is questionable whether civil society will ever become vibrant on
its own.
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